Abstract: Does the Internet provide an environment in which rational individuals can initiate and maintain relationships of interpersonal trust? This paper argues that it does. It begins by examining distinctive challenges facing would-be trusters on the net, concluding that, however distinctive, such challenges are not unique to the Internet, so cannot be cited as grounds for disparaging the rationality of Internet trust. Nevertheless, these challenges point up the importance of developing mature capacities for trust, since immature trusters are particularly vulnerable to the liabilities of Internet trust. This suggests that Internet trust can only be rational for those who have developed mature capacities for trust. But that suggestion ignores how trust on t he Internet m ay also facilitate the development of such capacities.
Introduction
M y aim in this p a p er is to consider w h eth er the Internet p rovides a n e nviron ment in w hich it is p ossible to en gage in r ational trust. However , b efore proceeding w ith this inquiry, a n umbe r of caveats a re in order. For the topic is overly br oad in at least t hree d ifferent respects: first, w it h r esp ect to the t ypes of I nternet exchanges tha t can b e examined w ith this question in mind; secondly, with r esp ect to t h e types of user groups that provide relevant con texts in w hich issu es of trust can be raised; a n d finally, w it h r esp ect to t h e kinds of actions and attit udes tha t theorists could reason ably h ave in mind wh en they speak of Internet ' t rust '. My own discussion will b e constr ained in the fo llowing ways. I will focus on the kinds of exch a nges tha t a r e interperson al in nature~hence, tha t occur within, a nd so p resu ppose, a sense of Interne t community built upon repetitive cont act a mon gst a gr oup of familia r user s. I w ill also focus on a p a rticular kin d of interpersonal trust , 'friendship trust ', wh ere the prima r y m ode of v ulnerability is psychological or em otion al. (H ereafter , all r efer ences to 'trust ' sh ould b e under stood as refe rences t o trust in this sense unless otherwise stipulated.) Fin ally, I will come t o interp r et my q uestion about the ration ality of Inte rnet trust as composed of two p arts: First , a nd most obv iously, it involves inqu iring into whether trust in this m edium can b e r eason a bly b ased given the kind of contact w ith others the Internet allows; but, second ly I claim, it sh ould also involve an investigation into h ow interper sonal exchanges in this m edium could en able the d evelopm ent of our capacities for ration al trust, wh ether on-or off-line.
This p a p er w ill pr oceed in three sections. In the first section , I consider r easons that a rgue in favour of supposing the Inte rnet is a p articula rly bad mediu m for 'ration al' trust , by which I w ill m ean initially, a p articula rly bad m edium for reasonably extending our trust to others. Of primary concern here is the sort of evidence available to us of the trustworthiness of others so encountered. For on the Internet, it's not just that individuals may hide importantly relevant features of themselves; they may actively mislead us in ways that invite our confidence. Hence, the decisions we make about when and how much to trust others are likely to be ill-informed or, worse, actively manipulated by them. To sharpen this discussion, I will give close attention to a particular case of Internet trust a nd betrayal. My aim here is to motivate conceptual distinctions that set the stage for arguing, in section two, that we need a more nuanced approach to the problern of Internet trust than such general concerns about the medium allow. In particular, I argue that the difficulties of Internet trust are importantly dependent on-i.e., magnified or decreased by-the maturity one brings to trusting relationships in general. The more mature the truster, the more capable they will be of reasonable trust, even on the Internet-i.e. trust that takes account of the limitations inherent in the situation. Hence, there is no good reason to argue against the rationality of Internettrust in general. However, this does not yet say much in favour of relationships of Internet trust. In the third section, I redr ess this imbala nce b y t ouching briefly on relationships of trust a mon g virt ual persons in the context of v irtual communities. M y aim h er e is to stress the d evelopmental p otential fo r us as trusters t hrou gh en gaging in relationships of Internet trust.
J ulie 's Tale : Does the Inte rnet Facilitate Irrational Trust?
The following is a true st ory of Interne t trust a n d b etrayal. 1 Julie was a deeply d isabled older woman liv ing in New York C it y wh o could push the ke ys of a computer with h er h ead-stick. Highly limited in wh at she could do in the p hysical w orld, Julie found h er metier on the Internet. Off-line, sh e was cabined, cribb ed a n d confined. On-line, sh e was able to lead a rich sociallife in keeping w it h h er expansive per son ality. Warm-hearted, talkative and caring, Julie soon became a pop ula r memb er of a New York Interne t con fer ence or ch at-room composed of like-minded women with w hom sh e could fra ternize on equal terms. Although sh e d id n ot hide h er d isability from othe rs, on the Internet it pr esented no p hysical or e motion al bar rier to be overcome. If anything, t h e h andicaps she b ore with p atien ce a nd good will b ecam e an inspira tion to othe rs, ma king h er all t h e m or e likeable. In ad dition, J u lie was a n extraord ina rily good listen er to oth er wom en's difficulties. Sh e was p erceptive, a r ticulate, though tful, full of good advice, a nd seemingly e nd lessly patient as m any women whom sh e m et t hrough t h e n et p oured out their trou b les and con cerns. Sh e becam e a solid frie nd t o ma n y, wh o felt tha t their lives h ad ch a nged for the better throu gh knowing Julie a nd from t a king h er adv ice.
But t his stor y h as a n u nh ap py end ing. After several years of pa rticipating in this Internet community, one of Julie's devoted admirers decided she wanted to further their friendship in person. Tracking Julie down in her N ew York apartment, the woman discovered that 'Julie' was no Julie at all. In fact, she was a man-a middle-aged psychiatrist who, besides being male, wasn't disabled at all. The woman was outraged, and after she made this fact known to the wider conference, the conference itself was deeply shaken. Reactions varied from a kind of resigned amusement all the way through to a feeling of total betrayal, especially amongst those who had shared their innermost feelings with Julie. One woman reputedly said, "I felt raped. I felt that my deepest secrets had been violated". Worse, those who had madegenuine gains in their personaland emotional lives felt that these gains were predicated on "deceit and trickery", hence were stripped of any value and should be repudiated. Although we haven't yet heard Julie's side of the story, this tale makes vivid why friendship trust on the Internet is a risky business. Such trust, as I said before, involves relying on someone in ways that make one psychologically or emotionally vulnerable to them rather than simply materially vulnerable, although the psychological and the material are often intertwined in more or less complicated ways. Still, my focus is on the kind of psychological vulnera bility tha t comes from trusting other s with ourselves rather tha n with our credit card numbe rs, or banking information, or to discha r ge contractual obligations , and so on. This, after all, is the way in which Julie's friends and admirers felt betrayed-in t h e way they understood themselves to rela t e most intima t ely and p ersonally t o another huma n b eing .
But n ow wh y did Julie's friends and admirers feel betrayed? The obvious a nswer is t hat Julie was not w ho sh e pretended to b e. 'She' was a m ade-up character , n othing but a fictional b eing, a mer e puppet masking the true ide ntity of someone altogeth er different . And t h e Internet p rovides ample opportunity for such deceit. For instance, people can hide their real selves in wh ole or in part, m asking fact s about their gende r, ethnicity, age, app eara nce, h ealth etc.; they can assume a variety of different identities w ith ease, b ecoming m ore than one phoney self; or they can even band together in real life in order to en act a single phoney self. This is con sequent on two features of Internet contact that give indiv iduals inordinate a mounts of control in wh a t information they convey about themselves t o p ot entially trusting other s: first, it is prima rily a t ext-based medium of interaction (though v ideo a nd voice contact are n ow also used with more frequ en cy) ; a nd secondly, it is primarily a uni-dimensional mode of inte raction-i.e., it is normally only text, a single m edium for conveying the sort of information on w hich t h ose wh o trust must rely for ma king judgements a b out the trust worthiness of others .
Consider now how both of these features inter ac t to play into a potential trick ste r 's h a nds. For instance, the fact tha t Internet contact is both textual a nd uni-dimensional means that we cannot d ep end on ou r usu al ways for cr osschecking the information we receive a b out others based on wha t t hey t ell us. Ordina rily, this involves our own observations of them based on their real b odily presence: t h eir looks a nd ma nner , not only in r elation to us, but in r elation to others with whom we can see them interact. Importa ntly, su ch observations have not only a cognitive component, but also an immediate visceral/ emotional component. We are often sensitive to subtleties of tone and manner that can't be expressed in words: We find ourselves reacting positively or negatively to others based on subliminally detected bodily cues. And we often are wise to trust our instincts under these conditions, since they constitute a reasonably accurate early warning system. For instance, researchers have established that subjects can become viscerally or bodily aware of a bad or dangerous situation well before they can articulate their concerns in a cognitively explicit way (Bechara et al. 1996; 1997) .
2 Internet communication thus deprives us of the bodily information we need for this early warning system to operate effectively. Furthermore, it seems that text-based interactions are particularly seductive in character when there is no sensory check on how to interpret what others say. For even when we are not actively misled by their words, our imaginations tend to roam freely over textually underspecified details. This imaginative freedom may be further encouraged by an unwitting hubris-a conviction that we have more judgemental control over the emotional and cognitive effects of 'mere words' than experience suggests. Consider, for instance, the powerful illusion cr eated by the computerprogram ELIZA. ELIZA was develop ed by J oseph Weizenba um a t the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab or a tor y in the early 1960s. In response to text-based input from ordina ry huma n users , ELIZA would analyse the syntactic structure of the text, and respond with a seemingly a ppropria te question or comment, m od elled on the kinds of questions a nd comments mad e by psych othera pist s . Inst ead of b eing b ored or tip p ed off by the fairly limited st yle of resp onse, p eople found the illusion of agency-indeed, the illusion of caring, con cerned agen cy -rem arka bly seductive. Weize nbaum rep orts, for inst a nce, tha t whe n he first introduced p eople to the program, they would sp end h ours w ith it discussing t h eir p ersonal problem s, unw illing to b eliev e tha t ther e was not a real agent b ehind the seemingly concerned a nd attentive ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1976) . Even n ow, there are Internet w ebsites wh ere individuals can go to p our out their trou bles t o ELIZA, seemingly unfazed by clear sta t eme nts tha t ELIZA is a mind less program. They either don 't b elieve it, or they d on't caret h e illusion of concerned agenc y is mor e than en ou gh for a good conversation, a t least of a pa r ticula r t he ra p eutic sort.
The mor e gen eral conclusion is this: text-based inte ractions a re a powerful stimula nt to our imaginations; they h ave a p ersu asive power all their own, and throu gh them , we a re r ema rka bly susceptible to projecting on to the originator s of that t ext (be t hey huma n or r obotic) w ha t ev er qualities we d etect in the tex t. Our judgeme ntal dista n ce is often much less tha n we imagine it to b e, p a rticularly wh en these inte ractions involve e motion al or sensory contents. This ma kes us particula rly prone to illusion in the dom ain of textu al communication, esp ecially wh en this is the only medium availa ble to us.
To summa rize the p roble rn with trust on the Internet thus far: It seems that t h e Interne t is a pa rticula rly bad medium for fomenting good , sta ble, n ondelusory rela tionships of trust-h ence, what we might call 'ration al' or 'r eason-able' trust-for two reasons. The first I will call the Proteus factor, after the Greek sea-god fabled to assume various shapes. The Proteus factor refers to the ease with which people can hide who or what they really are on the Internet. This may be clone explicitly as in Internet role-playing games (I will come back to these later in my paper) , or it may be clone implicitly, with individuals actively working to deceive others. The second reason the Internet is a bad medium for fomenting rational trust involves what I will call the Eliza factor: This refers to the ease with which people can be seduced by text -particularly interactive conversational text-viewing it willy-nilly as a kind of window on the soul of the agent who produces it, rather than (more cautiously) as a kind of mirrar that partly reflects their own imaginative projections. In other words, people often see what they want to see, especially when their 'seeing' is solely mediated by interpreting a disembodied string of appa rently trust-conducive utterances. This is a strong conclusion, and while I will not ultimately endorse it, I also don't want to minimize the strength of the considerations supporting it. These are liabilities for trust that are particularly pronounced on the Internet. However, it is also important to note that computer mediated communication is not the only way in which these t wo factors can p lay a role in pr omoting illusions and so undermining the cond itions for ration al trust.
Consider t h e u nha ppy stor y of Cyrano de Bergerac (Rost and 1959) . A la r gen osed roma n tic, Cyra n o consider s hirnself t oo ugly t o win his cousin Roxanne's love. Con sequen tly, h e spen ds years la n guishing by h er side in the r ole of trust ed frie nd a nd confida nte, never confessing his deep love for he r. R oxann e, m eanw hile, is on the lookout for true love, a n d aft er a few fleeting en counter s with Cyr ano's dashing a n d ha n dsom e frien d C hristia n , sh e t hinks sh e h as foun d the p erfect m ate. However , all is not well for these w ould-be lovers. It turnsout tha t C hristian does not have the kind of p oetic soul t h at Roxanne requires in a lover. He can't w in her by good looks alon e; a nd Cyra n o, w h ose soul is sufficiently poetic, assumes she will r eject him because of his unfortunate appearan ce. So the two m en team u p: C hristia n b ecomes Cyrano's physical proxy, a mou t h-piece for C yr a no's words tha t eventually w in Roxanne's undying devotion. But the question is, w it h wh om is she in love? N ot with C hristia n, w hose personality is kep t hidden from her , a nd n ot w it h Cyran o either , wh ose p osition as loyal and avuncula r cousin is a m ainstay in h er life. The object of h er love is, in fact, a fiction-an amalgamation of the two me n. It can' t su rvive in the real world, b ecause even thou gh Roxanne physically knows a n d inter acts w ith both C h ristian and Cyra no, the m an who sh e really loves is a fantasized p rojection of her own desire, supported by Cyran o's Protean deceit and h er own Eliza-like capacity t o b e sedu ced by wh at becomes la rgely text-based communication (the ma n y lett ers tha t Cyr a no writes t o he r u nder C hristia n 's n ame) . 3 T h e st ory ends in traged y, but it is a k ind of pa the tic tragedy in which one r eally feels that a little mor e h onesty a t certain crucial m omen ts would h ave at least given Roxanne some capacity to m ake a sensible decision ab out w hom to love and trust , given the realities of h er situation.
Of course, this story is only fiction, but it serves to show that the Internet only facilitates the kinds of practices of deceit and self-deceit that can occur in the physical presence of others, where presumably one can rely on other modes of interaction to check and qualify the judgements one makes about them. More sobering examples include all those real-life confidence tricksters who make a practice of relying on their physical attributes-honest appearance, convincing tone of voice, smooth manner-to dupe their victims, however normally savvy such victims might be. Hence, multimedia trust-trust that is developed through various media of interaction-may help reduce the likelihood of that trust being grounded on illusion, but it can't eliminate this possibility altogether. This is one cautious thing to be said against the detractors of Internet trust. But I think something more powerful can also be said in its defence. In order to do this, I return to the story of Julie.
Julie's Tale Revisited: Immature Versus Mature Relationships of Trust
In some ways, it is easy to understand and sympathize with the sense of b etra yal tha t Julie's friends and admire rs in this Internet community felt wh en her true identity was revealed t o them. Julie h ad deliberately lied to them a b out w ho and w ha t she was. Still, I h op e the re is also som e discomfort with the r eactions rep orted by some of these wom en. Recall tha t on e reputedly claimed to hav e felt 'ra p ed ', a nd a n other , tha t the p ositive gains in he r life were worth n othing since they h ad b een b ased on 'deceit and tricker y'. Of course, theseextreme r eactions w ere not universally sh a red. O t h er wom en, also friends of Julie's, confessed to feeling little m ore than ast onishment followed b y humoraus resigna tion as if som ething like t his might well h ave b een exp ected-not condon ed, mind you, n ot inv ited , but reasona bly a nticipa ted. What accounts for this ra n ge of reaction s? The Straightforward a nsw er is tha t these wom en differed in the amount of trust they had invested in Julie and in their r ela tion ships with h er: i. e., those who wer e not that trusting to b egin wit h felt relatively less b etrayed tha n those wh o wer e m ore trusting. While I think there is som e truth in this, a mere qua ntitative a n alysis is n ot nua nced en ough t o do justice to the r eal variet y of p ossible expla n a tions. For inst a nce, it d oesn't distinguish b etween two sorts of cases: (1) women who were less trusting in this situa tion b ecause they were gener ally less trusting, i.e. gen erally less cap able of trust in oth ers; a nd (2) wome n w ho we re 'less' trusting in this situation b ecause they were gen erally more capa ble of trusting well, h en ce of trusting a ppropria tely (i.e., with a ppropria te sorts of ex pecta tions) rela tive to the sit u ation. In other words, the wide r a nge of r eactions t o Julie's r ev ela tion might partially b e accounted for in terms of differ ences in the quality of trust extended by these wome n.
My point he re is tha t b etrayal is a complicat ed phen om enon. Obv iously, when someone b etrays another 's trust , they h ave inflicted a harm on the one b etrayed. But h ow that ha rm is exp erie nced b y the p er son b etr ayed a n d wh a t its consequences are will partially depend on that person's expectations and capacities with respect to initiating and maintaining relationships of trust. Thus, in contemplating Julie's story, one question we should want to pose is the following: what does it mean to trust well, to trust responsibly, to trust reasonably in someone over the Internet? And might the warnen who felt most undermined by Julie's betrayal be partially faulted in terms of the quality of their trust, rather than simply in terms of the fact of their trust? By this shift of emphasis, I do not mean to minimize Julie's own part in this story of betrayal; I simply mean to probe more carefully into the dynamics of trusting relationships.
I will begin this examination with an interesting remark Hubert Dreyfus makes in his recent book, On the Internet (Dreyfus 2001) . According to Dreyfus, there is a sort of trust that is not possible on the Internet because it requires bodily presence-that is, it requires our having the capacity, as he puts it, to look one another in the eye and shake one another's hands. In Dreyfus's words, "The kind of trust that requires such body contact is our trust that someone will act sympathetically to our interests even when so doing might go against his or her own" (Dreyfus 2001, 70) . In my view, this falls under the rubric of 'friendship trust', precisely the sort of trust tha t Julie's friends had invested in h er. Consequently, Dreyfus's rem a rk is clea rly a n overst atem ent: such trust is certainly possible on the Internet. But perhaps h e m eans to su ggest , in keeping with the worry voiced in Section 1, tha t friendship trust is irrational on the Internet b ecause trusting r eason ably in this sense requires that we be b odily present to one a nother. Otherwise, Drey fus implies, we op en ourselves t o making a kind of emotional error. For , in his view, well-grounded trust, "must draw on the sense of security and well-b eing each of us presumably exp erien ced as b abies in our care takers ' a rms" (Dreyfus 2001 , 71 ) . If we can h ave such a sense of security a bsent the emb odied presen ce of a nother, t h en we must simply be fa ntasizing such a pr ese nce~r eading into the cool voice of t ext the warm embrace of another's a rms. Less poetically, we mistakenly suppose that the traits of others that are m a nifested t hrough our textual interactions with them a re gr ounded in their caring embo died presence. Hence, we delusion ally expose ourselves to the possibility of deep a nd damaging betrayal.
I think Dreyfus gives a good diagnosis of w hy some of Julie's friends might have b een so badly undermined by the discover of her real identity. They trust ed in h er to p rovide just this kind of security in their lives. She was the ma temal figure to wh om they could turn for the absolute safet y of a genuine, albeit imagina ry embrace. Her physical embodiment in the real world t hus really mattered to them~mattered in the sense of sustaining their fantasy of w ho lay b ehind the surface exch a nge of text. I will call this kind of trust ' security trust ', a nd I agree with Dreyfus that such t rust can n ever be well-grounded on t he Internet, largely b ecause of the Proteus factor (the malleability of Inte rnet ide ntity) .
However , I think there is afurther question to ask about security trust~ v iz., is it the sort of trust that can be faulted more gener ally for its irra tion ality? In other words, is it the sort of trust tha t ra tional, self-sta nding adults sh ould b e seeking w heth er on t h e Internet or off it ? M y worry isthat in sofar as we trust this way as adults, we're looking for the wr a n g sort of thing in our trusting relations with others-viz., a kind of security that relationships among selfstanding adults cannot reasonably deliver. Consequently, relationships governed by these expectations are particularly vulnerable to breakdown; and when they break down, generate experiences of betrayal that are particularly traumatic. The problems of security trust may thus be exacerbated on the Internet, but they are not unique to the Internet. They stem, more fundamentally, from the fact that security trust is an immature form of trust to which we may all be attracted, but which ought to be guarded against, not by abandoning genuine relationships of trust-that would be a kind of madness-but by becoming more mature bothin our understanding andin our enactment of such relationships.
To flesh out this claim, I want to spend some time considering the differences between mature and immature relationships of trust, andin particular, the kind of dependency or vulnerability that characterizes the quality of trust in each. Following Dreyfus's lead, I will begin by characterizing what many refer to as 'infant trust'-the sense of security we first experience in our parents' arms.
4
Infant trust, we may say, is distinctive because of an infant's utter dependency on, and hence vulnerability to, others. As Lars Hertzberg says, "the huma n infa nt is not ... a n independently intelligible living unit, a nd not simply b ecause of the physical cares which he must receive from others, but b ecause the sense of his activ ity dep ends on the way in which it is interwoven with the activity of other" (Hertzberg 1989, 316) . The d evelopmental psychologist , Jerome Bruner, has called the sense-making structuring of the infant's activity, 'pa r ental scaffolding' . The idea behind it is tha t babies come into the world without much capacity for self-maintenance, stillless with the capacity for self d irect ed thought and action a nd, h en ce, for self-determination. Nevertheless, they h ave impressive capacities for imitation and, in particular, selective imitation, first, of the facial movem ents of their caretakers, then of body movements, a nd finally of actions with object s in their shared environment. These mutual imitation gam es, d elighted in by babies a nd parents alike, are the primary means by which infa nts identify themselves as like oth ers and so, eventually, as persans w hose thoughts and actions b elon g to the kind tha t p ersans produce. They are also the primary means by w hich parents mould children to react, think, and feel a b out t hings as p ersans do. A s the psychologist s Meltzoff a nd Gopnik rem ark, " ... mutual imita tion games a re a unique a nd important constituent of early interpersonal growth. Adults a r e both selective a nd interpretive in the b ehaviour they r eflect back to the child. They prov ide interpretive imitations to their infants, reflections that capture aspects of the infants activ ity, but then go beyond it to read in intentions a nd goals to that b ehaviour. ... This, in turn, leads the infa nt b eyond his or h er initial starting p oint. Likewise, selected actions, esp ecially those tha t a re potentially m eaningful in the culture, will b e reflected back [to the infant] mor e often than other s." (Meltzoff/Gopnik 1993, 349) The dependen cy the child experiences in the ha nds of the adult is thus the 4 The follow ing di scu ssion draws substantially on the ideas I explor e in McGeer 2002. dependency of 'self' constitution. The parent literally makes it possible for the child to define and understand itself in social space, which is a space at the same time created by the parent. The child's capacity for self-determination is thus, at this stage, ta ken on by the parent-eventually, of course, in order that the child ca n develop an independent capacity for self-determination. Paradoxically, then, self-determina tion must begin with other determination: the child becomes an agent by having its agency enacted by another. Now, is the bond in this relationship a bond of genuine trust?
There are good reasons to call it trust, but reasons not to as well. Trust, as many have pointed out, is not mere reliance, but reliance that importantly involves the mutual recognition of personhood. As Richard Holton claims, "Trusting someone does not involve relying on them and having some belief ab out them: a belief, perhaps that they a re trustworthy. What it involves is relying on them ... and investing that reliance with a certain attit ude." This attitude we normally take only towards people. As Holton elaborates, "when the car breaks down we might be angry; but when a friend lets us down we feel betrayed" (Holton 1994, 67) . Holton never fully cla rifies why we adopt such different attit udes t owards the things we r ely on as opposed t o the people we trust; but it seems clear tha t it must h ave to do w ith our expectations tha t others' b eh aviour towar ds us will be governed by their seeing us as p er sans and, sp ecifically, as p ersan s w h o treat the m as individ uals capable of acting in a trust worthy way.
5
Objects don't do tha t. Trust t hus involves, minimally, a complicated G ricean structure of person-specific recognition a nd acknowledgem ent. It involves (a) our acknowled ging other s as sources of self-determined action in their own right, w ith interests a n d desires wor t hy of resp ect ; (b) other s acknowledging us as sources of self-determined action in our own right, w ith inte rests a nd desires worthy of r esp ect, and fin ally (c) each of us acknowledging t h at these a t titudes are sha r ed bet ween us, a nd govern our actions a nd reactive attitudes t owards on e a nothe r. W ithout these attitudes, a nd their mutual recognition, we would be incap able of m or al interactions (Strawson 1974) . Now, in the case of the relationship between parent a nd infa nt, it is clear t h at the infant's development as an indep en dent agent dep e nds on t he p aren t's ackn owledgeme nt of t h e infa nt 's personh ood. B ut t h e infant is n ot yet a person, in thesense that h e is likewise capable of r ecognizing either the parent or hirnself as a p erson each in his or h er own right. At b est , the infant is cap able of w h at Meltzoff a nd Gopnik describe as a kind of function al recognition: here is som ething 'like m e', i.e., something tha t can be imit at ed a nd imitates me in return (Meltzoff/Gopnik 1993) . So t he infa nt is not yet in a position t o trust the parent. But it is trust-in-the-ma king, and made only b ecause the par ent beh aves as if t h e child trusts the pa r ent-i.e. the p arent acknowledges a nd ac ts towa rds the child as a person wh ose attitudes a nd actions towards the p arent a re not only self-determined, bu t also condition ed by the child 's recognition of the parent' s own personhood. In t his way, the child develops the G ricean aware ness of others and so comes to be the kind of being that can trust another, i.e. a being that is capable of full-blown adult trust (Hertzberg 1989) .
With this kind of contrast case in the background, we're now in a position to ask: what is so distinctive about mature relationships of adult trust? To begin with, they must involve dependencies that are very different in kind from the dependencies of 'infant trust'. Since the trusting adult does rely upon the other, she is vulnerable, like the infant, to actions and attitudes outside of her control. Nevertheless, the adult relationship between the truster and the trustee is importantly symmetrical. Unlike the infant, the adult truster does not depend on the other either for self-determination or for maintaining the relationship between them as a relationship between persons. She is an autonomaus person in her own right. The trust she gives is, therefore, genuinely chosen in that it issues from her own capacity for recognizing the relationship between her and the trustee as a relationship conditioned by mutual acknowledgement. And since such acknowledgement does not depend on the trustee's adopting the truster's role by treating her as if she were a person with self-directed thoughts and intentions, it follows that the thoughts and intentions the truster actually has must b e acknowledged by the trustee if the trustee is genuinely to treat the truster as a n a utonom aus person in h er own right. (No pa r ental make-believe is involved in such a relationship.)
The adult w ho trusts thus r equires from the trust ee something much m ore than the infant requires fr om t h e parent, and also som ething much less: The truster requires tha t h er vulnerability to the trustee be r ecognized as the v ulnerability of on e self-determined person t o another. It is thus a v ulnerability b ased on interests, needs, and desires w hich a re importa ntly t h e truster 's own a nd to which sh e trust s the othe r can a nd w ill b e sensitive, guiding his actions accordingly. But, of course, since the t ruster r equires t his kind of full acknowledgement from the trustee, she must give it as well-a nd thus be prepared for difficulty and disappointment. After all, the trustee is a p erson in his own right as w ell -w it h needs, desires, interests that a re importa ntly his own. So, even with all the good will in the world the trustee may n ot b e able t o live up to the truster's h opes and expectation s, either b ecause h e h as misunderstood t he trust er's n eeds a nd d esires or because his own n eed s a nd desires cannot be easily recon ciled wit h the truster 's own and cannot b e given up without serious compromise. The difficulties of trust b etween self-st a nding adults a r e t hus ones that stem from the n eed t o recognize a nd negotiate autonomaus interests. In particula r , since in t h e adult case, t h e trust ee d oes n ot t ake on t h e r ole of d etermining the truster's n eeds a n d desires, t h e trust ee can b etray the trusting adult in a way t hat the p a rent cannot b etray the so-called trusting child. This is not t o minimize wh a t can ha ppen to the child. On the contra r y. The child can be profoundly and invasively damaged by the pa r ent of whom it must rely. But because the parent ta kes on the r ole of d etermining a child's understanding of its own n eeds and desires, the child cannot exp erience, at least initially, the gap between self and other as a gap of potentially conflicting interests.
The b ottom line, t h en, is this: The exp erience of conflicting interests and the threat of b etrayal is much mor e salient in r elationships of adult trust. As we develop, we become aware of others in a way that infants are not aware of their parents: we are aware of others as having interests that make them potentially 'unsympathetic' to us, given our own interests, needs and desires. This awareness seems to militate against developing trust in others, where trust, as Dreyfus says, involves some confidence that others will act "sympathetically to our interests even when so doing might go against [their] own" (Dreyfus 2001, 70) . So the question is how do we adult trusters reconcile the two: awareness of potential conflict and the risk of betrayal, on the one hand, with a capacity for genuine confident trust, on the other? I see two possibilities.
One possibility is to retreat from the awareness altogether, simply expecting in our trusting relationships the very stability and security we experienced in infancy-a kind of unconditional care that depends on erasing any threatening sense of difference between self and other. This is the hallmark of 'security trust'. However, given the real existence of the other, how can this sense of total security be achieved except by erasing the other's real identity, and superimposing on them a fantasized identity constructed in terms of just those needs and interests that resonate with our own? Although the allure of this strategy is clear, I think it's also clear why it is inherently unstable a nd so highly vulnerable to breakdown. M oreover , since security-driven truster s fail t o d evelop resources for negotiating difficulties when they arise, they a re more liable than m ature trusters to experie nce any breakdown of trust in t erms of deep and traumatic betrayal-i. e. the sort of b etrayal that is essentially irreparable.
A second possibility, clearly preferable to the first , is to reconcile our awareness of genuine difference with the capacity for genuine trust by giving up on the n eed for absolute sec urity in our adult relationships of trust. Such security b elongs to the days of our infancy. Nevertheless, what we can h ave in adult relation ships of trust is p ot entially far more rewarding than me re security. Real difference invites the challenge of real discovery and the possibility of mutual enrichment. In trusting others who differ from ourselves, we create bonds of mutual concern, inter est and support that provide a platform for exploring asp ects of the world and our human condition that we might not get to on our own. Maturetrust involves risk; but when all goes well, it makes other things p ossible that we would not, or could n ot, achieve by ourselves. The m ature truster und erstands this dy namic and accepts what it implies, namely-uncertainty, some inevitable divergence of interests, and potential confiict and breakdown:
Uncertainty. In d eveloping adult r elationships of trust, m ature trust ers must deal with others whom they know only incompletely, partly because they have only limited eviden ce to go on, and partly because they recognize that individual character is not fixed in stone: like them , others are to some ext ent cha n geable, d epending on their changing circumsta n ces a nd experiences, and such cha n ges can always affect on-going relationships of trust . Because of this incomplete knowledge, m ature trusters accept that they must inevitably trust under conditions of uncertainty; trust means t aking a calculated leap beyond the evidence.
Divergence of interests. No matter how much the truster's interests seem to converge with trusted othe rs, real differ en ce means recognizing the inevitability of diver ging inter ests.
Potential confiict and breakdown. The inevitability of diverging interests means problemswill inevitably arise within relationships of trust. Mature trust involves recognizing this fact above all others. Functionally, it means developing the capacity to tolerate and negotiate differences when they arise. Consequently, mature trusters must develop resources to respond well when trust breaks down, despite the pain and disappointment such breakdowns may occasion.
Applying this analysis now to Julie's story, we might expect a mature truster to act rather differently on the discovery of her off-line identity occasion than an immature truster. For instance, as a friend of Julie's, the mature truster would seek to understand the reasons for Julie's deceit: Were her---or, rather, hismotivations inimical to friendship? Was he playing this character just for his own amusement, laughing at the women he was deceiving? Or did he have some possibly forgivable motive-say, a desire for intimacy that he felt he couldn't get by confessing his gender? (In fact, this was the explanation he gave.) Note that, in the context of mature trust, to judge that a motive is potentially forgivable does not entail the inevitable resumption of trust; but it does signal that, in the truster's view, there may be a way forward from such moments of betrayal to forging a new kind of r elationship, premised on deeper mutual knowledge and under sta nding , a nd thereb y paving the way for the possibility of ren ewed and better trust.
Mature trust is thus a kind of r eason ed , explor ative trust. Its primary impetus is n ot the need for security, but the desire to take calculated risks for the purpose of leading a richer huma n life. Mature trusters a r e indiv iduals wh o trust , but who trust with care. They use car e in three significant ways-namely, in ext ending their trust, in monitaring their relationships of trust, a nd in responding well to others wh en diffic ulties or breakdowns occur:
Extending trust. Mature trusters a r e discerning. They do n ot t hrow t hemselves into r elationships of trust, but n or do they hold back when opportunities for trust p resent themselves. Because mature trust ers are sec ure in them selves, they can afford to be exploratory in their trusting relationships, r ecognizing, but also testing, the kinds of conditions that effect r elationships of trust in various ways. Thus, for instance, m ature trusters a re equipped to make distinctions between trust on the Internet and t rust extended in other ways. Still, the fact tha t there are unique a nd interesting challenges for trust on the Internet does not st op the m ature truster from facing those ch allen ges a nd b enefiting from the rela tionships made possible there by.
M onitaring relationships of trust. For mature trust ers, trust is not a on e-off investment in a trusted other. It involves building a nd maintaining a relationship of trust that is sensitive to the cha n ging attitudes a nd circumsta nces of trust er a nd trustee.
Respanding well to others when difficulties of breakdowns occur. Mature trusters understand that difficulties and break downs a re pa rt a n d pa r cel of r elationships of adult trust. Despite t he p ain a nd disappointment inevita bly caused by su ch occurren ces, mat ure trusters work to understand the circumstances surrounding t h em. And if p ossible and desirable, they work to r egen erate t h eir relationships of trust, perhaps even healing breaches in ways that make those relationships stronger than they were before.
In short, mature trusters are sensible about their trust, but they are also ready and willing to trust under conditions which allow them to balance the difficulties of engaging with fully autonomaus and only partially known others against the many prospective rewards that come from relationships of trust.
Can the Internet provide such conditions? I don't see why not. Consequently, we have no good reason to insist that trust on the Internet of the sort I've been discussing cannot be rational. It can be rational just in case it provides mature trusters with the opportunities to engage well with others, developing the kind of responsive attentive relationships that we expect with our friends. It may still be somewhat limited trust-limited because it is uni-dimensional, confined to the medium of textual exchange. Relationships of trust are generally multimedia, deepening with the multifaceted ways we have of interacting with one another. But textual exchange is one of our best ways to bring mind into contact with mind, and heart eventually to heart, so I see no reason why Internet relationships cannot deepen over time in a similar kind of way. Of course, if they do so deepen, they are likely to spill over into life off-line.
. The Presentation of Self in Internet Life
In the last section, I argued that trust on the Internet can be rational-that is to say, the re is no reason why t ext-based inte ractions should not provide m ature truster s with opportunities t o engage well and resp onsibly with trusted othe rs, d eep ening a nd broadening their rela tionships with these oth ers over time. Of course, there a r e distinctive challen ges to building trust on the Internet as we saw in Section 1, and m ature trusters must proceed in reflective awareness of t h em. To review t hose challen ges he re:
The first h as t o do with the fact tha t Internet ide ntity is rela tively less grounded tha n identity off-line, allowing Internet p ersonas to float somewh a t free of the real world indiv iduals wh o en act them. I called this the Proteus factor. One consequ ence of this is t h at indiv idual identity on the Internet must b e associated more directly with a n agent's intersu bj ective prop erties-i. e., properties the agent ma nifests in r elating to other s-rather than, as is often the case off-line, with the agent's p er son al d escriptive properties-i. e. prop erties, like age, sex, profession, app earan ce and so on, that pick the agent out as a particula r identifiable p er son. Normally, wh o we take som eone to be in t his descriptive sense has a dramatic impact on h ow we exp ect t h em to act towards us, and so on how we act towards them in turn. This is the p ower of ster eotyping . On the Internet, we a r e n ot quite d ep rived of t his guide to anot her's likely profile of inter-subjective behaviour, since indiv iduals w ill present themselves as possessing various personal descriptive prop erties. But since these descriptions a re w h olly w ithin t heir control, they can be used more ma nipula tively t h an in life off-line to sha p e their recipients' inter subj ective expectations. Julie's st ory is a prime example of such manipulation. How b ad is t his for Internet trust? As we shall see in a moment, it may not be so bad after all. But it is something that individuals must be aware of if they are to trust well on the Internet.
The second challenge for Internettrust involves what I called the Eliza f actor: Because Internet personas are manifested only in text, it allows others to project more freely onto them whatever fantasies they have about the off-line agents who enact the personas. This can have painful consequences. Because we will inevitably feel betrayed if the persans we trust do not live up to our expectations, it's important to have expectations that are realistically grounded if we are to trust reasonably and well. The problern of forming unrealistic expectations based on our fantasies about others arenot unique to the Internet, but they can be greatly facilitated by the textual medium in which Internet exchanges are conducted.
While those who trust well may compensate for these liabilities of Internet interaction, we have seen that those who trust badly-immature or irrational trusters-may fall prey to them. Indeed, they may use the limitations of Internet interactions to avoid the responsibilities and risks of full adult trust. So, perhaps the best that can be said for trust on the Internet is that its special challenges do n ot rule out ra tion al trust, but t h ey cer tainly don't ma ke it easy either. Thus, it m ay seem reason able t o conclude that ther e a r e n o positive advantages to building relationships of t rust on the Internet. B ut I t hink this j udgement would b e over-hasty. I close b y considering som e possible advantages of Internet t r ust that m ay out weigh t h e obvious liabilities and, in fact, a re inter estingly rela t ed to those lia bilities.
So fa r my a rgumen t has been tha t the pa rticula r liabilities of Internet trust , w hich I've called t he Proteus a nd Eliza fact or s, a r e not u niqu e to t h e Internet; they a r e just gr eatly magnified b y the Inte rnet. Thus , p roblems of Inte rnet trust ma ke m ore salien t problem s that exist in a n y rela tionships of t r ust . For p eople present the mselves to us in ever yday life, m asking som e aspects of ch a rac ter , highlighting othe rs; a n d on the b asis of our limited exp osure to them , we interp ret t h e sign s that they give us as favo ura ble or unfavourable for t rust. We ca n b e ma nipula ted in m a king these ju dgem ents by wh a t they p r esen t to us; and we can also b e m a nipu lated in ma king t h ese ju dgements by wh at we ourselves project onto them as a con sequence of our n eeds a n d desires. Now, if b uilding rela tion ships of trust on the Internet m akes m ore salient difficulties that are already present in forging a ny rela tionships of adult t r ust, then by making these difficulties more salient Internet use ma y force a pr actice of r eflection on t h ese d iffic ulties a nd a d irect en gagement w ith them t h at engen ders in turn m ore mat ure capacities for trust .
In su pport of this su ggestion, I want to conclu de b y b riefly considering a particula r form of text-based multi-user inter action on t h e Internet t h at h as becom e increasingly p opula r: the so-called M UD or v irtual societ y. Unlike Internet con fere nces and ch at rooms, MU Ds involve a form of interact ion in w hich the P r oteus factor is, as it wer e, for malized. Individual pla yers explicitly creat e and en act person as that a re understood t o b e descriptively different from their offline selves along a n y of a number of different dimen sions: gen d er , ethnicity, age, profession, a nd even species (some MUD p ersonas could a t m ost b e ch a r ac terized as 'humanoid', and humanoid only because of their interpersonal characteristics rather than their physical characteristics as described by those who enact them).
MUDs are extremely popular. No doubt for a variety of reasons, people are deeply attracted to enacting personas they make up themselves, and interacting with other such personas in a virtual world that is communally constructed. Are such activities pure escapism? Perhaps to a certain degree. But it is interesting to note how deeply invested dedicated MUD players become in this shared virtual world, in their relationships with other personas in that world, and most of all, in the personas they create for themselves. For instance, one such player remarked, "MUDS make me more what I really am. Off the MUD, I am not as much me" (Turkle 1996, 54) . This statement seems to reflect a Sentiment that is widely shared among dedicated MUD players. Presumably, it shows that they are able to lead lives in this virtual space and via their MUD personas that allow them to experience their own potential for creative activity and social engagement in more direct and rewarding ways than they can in 'reallife'. But why should this be?
I can think of two important reasons (which might be relevant to Julie's case as well). The first involves avoiding, or a t least m odifying, the effects of st ereot yping in the real world. As I pointed out earlier, people's v iews a b out w h om t h ey a re interacting w ith h as a powerful effect on how they expect t h ose indiv iduals to b ehave and on h ow they sh ould govern their behaviour t owards them in turn. Stereotypes h ave a profound effect on t h e scop e of indiv iduals' social agency. It m ay b e impossible to escape these effects completely. But by playing with the person al properties of self-presenta tion, it may b e possible to alter t h e sh a p e of on e's social agency by p rovoking other s t o apply stereotyp es that a re different from those they would a utoma tically apply in the real world. Thus, for example, many M UD players enact p erson as wit h the opposite gender from their own just to experience w h a t is possible for them within a differe ntly gende red social space (Bruckman 1996) .
A second, p erhaps more interesting r eason involves self-development. Studies in social psychology show that when individuals publicly e nact personality traits t h at they do not really take themselves to p ossess, t his has a lasting effect on h ow they come to think of themselves-t hey t hink of them selves as now p ossessing those traits (Tice 1992) . In othe r words, it seems that though the very process of h aving the traits they en act accepted by other s as part of themselves, indiv iduals them selves com e to accept their b eh aviour as stemming m ore directly from who they r eally a re. This may not be so surprising; but it does show that for m a ny players, wh at m ay b egin as a kind of enjoyable public m a ke-believe becomes a p owerful source of self-ena blem ent a nd, he nce, of self-development.
If these sorts of reasons explain wh y individuals rep ort feeling 'more like them selves ' in the context ofrole-playing games, I think it also clarifies that wh at matters m ost to agents' sense of self-identity in the M UD is n ot who the y a re in terms of personal descriptive prop erties, but rather who t h ey are in t erms of their inte rsubjective properties-i.e., in t erms of the traits they a r e en abled to en act in relation to oth er p erson as. And, of course, w ha t m atters to agents m ost in terms of the identities of other p ersonas with wh om they interact is the inte rsubjective traits of these personas in turn. Relationships of trust and friendship in the MUD thus depend on the stability of players' intersubjective properties-hence, on their taking responsibility for maintaining their characters in relationships to one another, and of responding well to the concerns of one another when conflicts arise. Moreover, such responses have come to include, interestingly enough, explicit reflection on the difficulties of trust and civil behaviour in the MUD given the way players' identities are constructed and maintained. (There are special forums for such discussions on MUDs, usually in the form of a mailing list to all participants-e.g. *social-issues in the MUD LambdaM00). 6 My point in discussing these virtual communities is just this: The fact that friendship and community survive, sometimes even flourish, in such forums shows the extent to which individuals can and do take responsibility for fomenting and maintaining relationships of trust, explicitly regulating their behaviour to compensate for conditions that destabilize and potentially undermine such trust. My claim is not that these relationships can substitute for relationships of trust in the real world, where the risks and vulnerabilities for self and others are presumably much more serious. My claim is rather that such conditions can make the d ifficulties inher ent in r ela tionships of trust more apparent to Internet trusters, thus challenging the m to r espond t o these difficulties in ways tha t d evelop their own r eflective capacities for en gaging in r elationships of mature trust both on and off-line. In the words of Sherry Turkle, "Virtual p ersonae can be a resource for self-reflection a nd self-transformation. Having literally written our on-line world into existence, we can use the communities we build inside our machines t o improv e the ones outside of them. Like the anthropologist r eturning h ome from a foreign culture, the voyager in virtuality can return to the real world better able to unde rstand what about it is arbitrary a nd can b e ch a n ged." (Turkle 1996 , 57) 
